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ARCHITECTURAL REGULATION AND THE
EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL NORMS
LEE TIEN
Current legal scholarship on architectural regulation of
software focuses on how its lack of transparency may frustrate
public accountability or, by the same token, enhance its
effectiveness. This paper argues that architectural regulation
poses deeper dangers to the very concept of law. Ordinarily, we
think of law as rules that a person thinks about when deciding
how to act, and which human beings must decide to enforce.
Law as architecture operates differently. instead of affecting our
calculus of choice, it structures the very conditions of action,
such as social settings and the resources available in those
settings. Thus, architectural regulation operates surreptitiously
and may not even be perceived as governmental action.
Architectural regulation thus allows government to shape our
actions without our perceiving that our experience has been
deliberately shaped, engendering a loss of moral agency.
Because our norms are often the product of social experience
with and discourse about new technologies, architectural
regulation poses the danger that government can distort the
evolution of constitutional norms like privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
We normally think of law in terms of textual rules. The
ubiquity and malleability of computer software, however, has
led scholars like Joel Reidenberg and Larry Lessig to coin and
popularize another concept, that of architectural regulation.1
These scholars argue that software, or computer "code",
regulates human action as do codes of law.2 As Lessig puts it,
1 See, e.g., Joel Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation
of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1998);
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999)
[hereinafter "CODE"].
2 Reidenberg, supra note 1, at 554-555 ("[F]or network
environments and the Information Society, however, law and government
2003-2004
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software "constrain[s] some behavior (for example, electronic
eavesdropping) by making other behavior possible
(encryption)."3
Code and law regulate our behavior in different ways;
while the law typically regulates behavior after the fact, code or
architecture regulates "more directly," as "present constraints."
4
These differences are important, as a practical matter, to the
"legal engineering" choice of how to regulate different kinds of
activities.
But code-as-law - and architectural regulation more
generally - also raises normative issues that transcend both
technology and regulatory craftsmanship. Lessig argues that
architectural regulation poses a transparency problem, warning
that government regulation in the architectural mode can "hide
its pedigree." 5 He thus contends that "[w]hat a code regulation
does should be at least as [apparent] as what a legal regulation
does."6 Neal Katyal, on the other hand, argues that the
transparency problem is overstated and recommends more
government use of architectural regulation. 7
Lessig is right that architectural regulation poses a
serious transparency problem, especially where privacy and
"high-tech" architectures are concerned. I suggest, however, that
architectural regulation has more transparency problems than
Lessig identifies. His concern - that architectural regulation can
hide its pedigree - is indeed significant. But it is not that
different from the transparency problem posed by many
ordinary legal rules. Much law in the modern administrative
state is obscure. Agricultural subsidies and tax breaks might as
well be invisible to the average person. Indeed, one of Lessig's
best examples of regulatory ball-hiding is about how the federal
regulation are not the only source of rule-making. Technological capabilities
and system design choices impose rules on participants.") (citation omitted).
3 Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw
Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 510 (1999).
4 CODE, supra note 1, at 237.
5 Id. at 98.
6 Id. at 224.
7 Neal Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1003, 1105-1106 (2001); id. at 1104 ("It is at least debatable as to whether
government regulation of software and hardware would be less transparent
than these realspace regulations.") (noting lack of transparency associated
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government required federally funded clinics to tell patients
that abortion is "not . . . an appropriate method of family
planning," thus exploiting the fact that patients would be
"unlikely to hear the doctor's statement as political broadcast
from the government."8
This essay focuses on an additional aspect of
architecture's transparency problem: that because architectural
regulation regulates settings or equipment in order to regulate
behavior, it changes the nature of rule-presentation and rule-
enforcement in ways that are likely to decrease publicity or
visibility. This might be acceptable if all we care about is the
effectiveness of social control, but not if we care about law as a
public process.
Furthermore, as in the old saying "freedom of the press
belongs to those who own them" suggests, our rights often
depend on resources. Architectural regulation could shape or
foreclose social experience with resources used to exercise or
protect rights, thus distorting the evolution of both social norms
and the rights tied to those norms. For example, a proposal to
4Coutlaw encryption methods that law enforcement cannot
decipher" 9 could deprive society of experience with a privacy-
enhancing technology. 10
We should therefore be extremely careful about the use of
architectural regulation. Stripped of its high-tech trappings,
architectural regulation is simply government action directed at
the real-world conditions of human activity, tangible or
intangible, which in turn affects what people can or are likely to
do.
Beyond software and computers, architectural regulation
thus highlights the relationship between resources, rights and
norms. In the short run, government action directed at resources
can affect the concrete exercise of rights. In the long run, such
government action can affect or distort the evolution of the social
norms that give life to those rights.
8 CODE, supra note 1, at 96-97.
9 Katyal, supra note 7, at 1049 (citation omitted).
10 See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPUTER
SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD, CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN
SECURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 167-215, 265-273 (1996) (discussing
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II. COMPARING LEGAL RULES AND ARCHITECTURAL
REGULATION
In this section, I argue that architectural regulation,
provisionally defined as regulation intended to influence acts by
shaping, structuring, or reconfiguring the practical conditions or
preconditions of acts, challenges the traditional view of law as
rules.
Architecture inhabits the realm of context, not text: it is
embedded in settings or equipment, and can affect us directly
without our being aware of what it does. As a result,
architectural regulation exploits asymmetries in the social
distribution of knowledge. Its effects are normatively significant
because we often are not aware that architecture is deliberately
being used to constrain our action. And even if we are aware of
it, we might not understand how we are being constrained.
A. DIFFERENTIATING LEGAL RULES AND ARCHITECTURAL
REGULATION
We generally think of law in terms of rules and of "the
law" as a system of rules.11 Law as social control is often
described in terms of rules 12 that state primary norms of
conduct. We apply sanctions to those who breach these norms 13
in hopes of inducing compliance. 14 As sociologist Howard Becker
puts it, "[a]ll social groups make rules and attempt, at some
times and under some circumstances, to enforce them. Social
rules define situations and the kind of behavior appropriate to
11 See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Definition and Theory in
Jurisprudence, 70 LAW Q. REV. 37, 42-49 (1954) (using as a metaphor the
rules of a game).
12 ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES 124 (1991) (describing social control in terms of different
orders of rules and sanctions).
13 Ellickson uses the existence of "nonhierarchical systems of
social control" to argue that social order often arises "spontaneously." Id. at 4.
But his notion of spontaneous social order is directed primarily against legal
centralism, the presumption that the law is the center of social order. His
characterization of social control remains grounded in "rules of normatively
appropriate human behavior" that are "enforced through sanctions." Id. at
124.
14 ELLICKSON, supra note 12, at 124. (Alternatively, a rule that
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them, specifying some actions as 'right' and forbidding others as
'wrong."' 15
One difference between legal and other social rules or
norms lies in the administration of sanctions, i.e., how rules are
enforced. 16 Social norms are informally enforced through
sanctions like social disapproval and motivated by the desire for
esteem or to be perceived as a good potential transaction
partner; legal rules are formally enforced. 17 On this view, both
legal rules and social norms are backed by independently
applied sanctions.
In short, legal rules are typically backed by sanctions and
aimed at an actor's decision to act. For economists and
utilitarians, legal rules influence behavior by changing the
behavior's "price," i.e., by decreasing its expected value to the
potential wrongdoer. For those who emphasize law's expressive
function, legal rules also signify our belief in, and commitment
to, particular norms of conduct.18 Either way, the point is to
shape the actor's preferences among available options.
Architectural regulation does not work this way. Consider
the following situation: in a drug-infested neighborhood, dealers
use public coin telephones so that their calls cannot be traced to
their home phones. The coin phones are then removed to stop
such calls. Such regulation is not fully captured by the model of
sanction-backed or duty-declaring rules. Neither sanctions nor
duties are imposed upon the drug dealers by such action. They
remain "free" to act, but their conditions of action have been
15 HOWARD BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF
DEVIANCE 1 (1997 ed.); id. at 129-134 (using legislation as a model to analyze
the career of both formal and informal rules).
16 ELLICKSON, supra note 12, at 130-131 (typing sanctions); see
also ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC 95 (1971) ("[a] social norm is
that kind of guide for action which is supported by sanctions") (classifying
sanctions as organized/formal or diffuse/informal).
17 See, e.g., Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and
Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997) (developing esteem theory);
Daniel Gilman, OfFruitcakes and Patriot Games, 90 GEO. L. J. 2387 (2002)
(reviewing ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2002) (arguing that
compliance with social norms signals that one is a good cooperative partner)).
18 See Ted Sampsell-Jones, Culture and Contempt: The
Limitations of Expressive Criminal La w, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 133, 136-137
(2003) (showing how drug control laws have been championed as ways of
expressing society's disapproval of drug use).
2003-2004
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changed through the elimination of a resource (phones) with a
design feature that facilitated drug dealing (untraceability).19
While both architectural and legal regulation are
intended to affect people's actions, the typical sanction-backed
rule targets the actor's decision whether to act. The legal rule is
an attempt to alter preferences. The implicit vision of the actor
here is as one who chooses.
Architectural regulation, by contrast, structures the
conditions of action, e.g., social settings and/or the resources
available in those settings. It thus regulates the behavior that
occurs in those settings or that utilizes those resources. In my
payphone example, the option of making anonymous phone calls
was simply removed. Choices, not preferences, were targeted.
The implicit vision of the actor here is as one who can be
manipulated.
Architectural regulation is also enforced differently than
sanction-backed rules. It creates a present constraint on action:
no human being or social institution need impose a cost after the
fact. As Lessig puts it: "think of the constraints blocking your
access to the air-conditioned home of a neighbor who is gone for
the weekend. Law constrains you - if you break in, you will be
trespassing. Norms constrain you as well - it is unneighborly to
break into your neighbor's house. Both of these constrains,
however, would be imposed on you after you broke into the
house. They are the prices you might have to pay later. The
architectural constraint is the lock on the door - it blocks you as
you are trying to enter the house."20
In addition, the regulatory target need not be aware that
there has been a decision to constrain his or her actions.21 While
the deterrent effect of a sanction-backed rule generally requires
some knowledge about the rule, and may be enhanced by the
target's awareness, architectural regulation may be more
effective when it is not perceived as a deliberate constraint.
Most parents know that an effective way to keep a small child
from playing with a noisy toy is to secretly remove it.
19 For an extended discussion of architectural crime-control
techniques, see Neal Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L. J.
1039 (2002).
20 CODE, supra note 1, at 237.
21 Katyal supra note 19, at 1072 (noting that "crime-control
strategies based on legal sanctions or public norms.., generally work best
when a potential offender has knowledge of them.").
TIEN
7
TIEN: ARCHITECTURAL REGULATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL NORMS
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2005
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
Given the importance of social settings, resources, and
equipment to people's everyday behavior, it is clear that
architectural regulation as I have defined it can take many
forms. The criminal justice literature has long considered these
possibilities under the rubrics of "situational crime prevention"
and "crime prevention through environmental design."22 My
payphone example illustrates one of the simplest forms:
changing the availability or distribution of resources in social
settings. Changing the design of resources is another
architectural technique. The coin payphones could have been
reconfigured as credit-card phones, creating traceability.
Facilitation of surveillance or information-gathering within a
social setting or via equipment is a key technique of
architectural regulation. 23
More subtle forms can be imagined. If the government
encourages equipment with a preferred design feature and
discourages those without it, more behavior is regulated.
Instead of requiring the elimination of coin payphones, or their
replacement by credit-card phones, the government could
change the incentives faced by private telephone companies.
Credit-card phones themselves, or the removal of coin
payphones, could be subsidized. Such techniques were used to
attempt to control encryption. A national study of encryption
policy explained that government officials hoped that "law-
enforcement-friendly" encryption would become "a de facto
standard for use in the private sector," perhaps eventually
depriving consumers of a "genuine choice."24
B. COMPARING THE CAREERS OF LEGAL RULES AND
ARCHITECTURAL REGULATION
I have described, from a relatively static perspective, how
architectural regulation is not like sanction-backed legal rules,
and why this should matter. In this section I use a more
22 See generally Nancy G. La Vigne, Safe Transport: Security by
Design on the Washington Metro, in SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION:
SUCCESSFUL CASE STUDIES (R.V. Clarke ed., 1997).
23 Nancy LaVigne, Visibility and Vigilance: Metro's Situational
Approach to Preventing Subway Crime, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE:
RESEARCH IN BRIEF, (Jeremy Travis, dir., Nov. 1997) (noting that situational
crime prevention "aims to reduce criminal opportunities."), available at
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/166372.pdf (last accessed Nov. 8, 2004).
24 CRISIS Report, supra note 10, at 187-188.
2003-2004
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dynamic perspective in order to emphasize the transparency
issues associated with architectural regulation.
1. LEGAL RULES HAVE CAREERS
From a sociological perspective, legal rules and the norms
they promote are often objects of social conflict. Becker observes
that legal rules and the norms they embody have careers. 25 A
rule's career begins with its promulgation or creation, and then
continues in its enforcement (or lack of it).
For the most part, legal rules are publicly created and
presented. We should not overstate the degree to which the
process of rule-creation really is public, of course. Much
legislative activity takes place behind closed doors in the realm
of lobbying, arm-twisting, and influence -peddling.
Administrative regulation in federal agencies is also public - but
again with a significant back-room component. Nevertheless, the
ultimate outputs - the rules themselves - are generally
published and available, theoretically, to everyone.
Rules, moreover, need some minimal level of enforcement
to be meaningful. Enforcement of rules is normally a complex,
enterprising human activity. Rule-breaking must be detected;
someone must bring that detected breach to the attention of the
appropriate agency; that agency must decide to address the
breach in some way, ranging from ignoring it to taking it to
court. The human actors who perform these tasks generally
possess discretion and exercise judgment about when, and under
what circumstances, to act. Enforcement activities require
resources, and many take place in public arenas that permit
social contest over the meaning and legitimacy of the rule itself.
Resource allocation in public agencies is part of the more-or-less
public budgetary process; prosecuting offenders requires public
accusations.
That these choices exist is integral to the social
organization of law as we know it, because public processes like
resource allocation and punishment tell us about the
consequences of our rules. Rules perceived to be unjust may lead
to social outcry, amendment, or even repeal. To some extent,
rule-enforcement operates as a social feedback mechanism.
25 BECKER, supra note 15, at 129; see also Edna Ullmann-
Margalit, Revision of Norms, 100 ETHICS 756 (1990) ("Norms, as social
institutions, have careers. They emerge, endure, pass away.").
TIEN
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2. ARCHITECTURAL REGULATIONS HAVE
DIFFERENT CAREERS
We should expect the careers of architectural regulations
to be quite different. It is not clear, for instance, how the
removal of payphones in my example would be "enacted." It
might have been the phone company's or the government's
decision; the ordinary phone user is unlikely to know. Indeed,
we may not even perceive that a decision intended to regulate
our actions was made. Often, we simply have no clue as to who
made the key design decisions regarding our settings or
equipment.
Enforcement often occurs simply as a consequence of
finding oneself in the architected setting or using the architected
equipment or system. The role of human beings in enforcement
is greatly reduced. Once the payphones are removed, drug
dealers simply cannot make untraceable coin payphone calls.
The nature of noncompliance also changes. Drug dealers
can continue to ply their illicit trade if they go to a neighborhood
with coin payphones. Or they might use cheap, disposable cell
phones. Disobedience of architectural regulation, in other words,
involves either exit from the architected system or
circumvention of the architected constraint.
Architectural regulation can be a quite blunt enforcement
instrument, lacking a mitigating feedback loop. Removing the
payphones affects everyone, not just the drug dealers. But if the
payphone removal is not perceived as regulation in the first
place, no one will complain that the government acted unwisely.
The constraint will simply persist. Changed conditions could
lead to new payphones being installed, of course, but the
government's hand might still remain invisible.
From the enforcement perspective, then, architectural
regulation bypasses many of the possibilities for human actors
to modulate the effects or meaning of a rule in the enforcement
process. Enforcement is instead delegated to equipment or social
settings, lessening the possibility of social contest over the rule.
The ordinarily public process of social conflict over rules may be
short-circuited simply because we do not see what is happening.
2003-2004
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C. ARCHITECTURAL REGULATION AND ITS VICISSITUDES
The metaphor of "architecture" suggests that
architectural regulation possesses a structural nature, i.e., it is
built into or embedded in the practical conditions of everyday
life. Two obvious candidates for architecting are the things we
use - equipment - as well as social settings, most of which
contain equipment. This metaphor also suggests the important
role of architects: those actors or groups, or successions of actors,
who designed or shaped equipment and social settings.
The metaphor suggests third, beyond architecture and
architecting, that there is something distinctive about how we
perceive architecture. Walter Benjamin says, "[a]rchitecture has
always represented the prototype of a work of art the reception
of which is consummated by a collectivity in a state of
distraction."26 Unlike a painting, which announces itself as art
and before which one may concentrate, "[b]uildings are
appropriated in a twofold manner: by use and by perception."27
We experience architecture "not so much by attention as by
habit. ... [E]ven optical reception ... occurs much less through
rapt attention than by noticing the object in incidental
fashion."28
1. LAw As LAw: ISSUES OF VISIBILITY OR
RECOGNITION
We often take the architecture of our physical and social
worlds for granted. A good architect or urban planner designs
spaces and throughways to regulate flow; drivers and
pedestrians need not be aware of his intent.
We should pay close attention to "law as architecture"
because part of what distinguishes law from social control is
that it is perceived as law. Law at some level appeals to
legitimacy: our vision of law as rules is linked to notions of
26 WALTER BENJAMIN, ILLUMINATIONS 239 (Hannah Arendt ed.,
Harry Zohn trans., 1988).
27 Id. at 240.
28 Id.; see also Katyal, supra note 19, at 1072 (quoting an
architecture dean as saying "you live in architecture, and it affects you
whether you're even conscious of it.") (citation omitted).
TIEN
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public processes of competing readings, and appeals to
metaphors of textuality, authorship, and audience reception.
By contrast, an architected setting or piece of equipment
often appears to us as a fait aeeompli. A danger of architectural
regulation, then, is that we may perceive it, as Benjamin
suggests, only "in incidental fashion." Architectural regulations
are at the extreme perceived more as conditions than as rules to
be followed or disobeyed consciously. Unlike ordinary sanction-
backed rules, architecture achieves compliance by default rather
than through active enforcement. To the extent that legitimacy
and public deliberation are integral to our notion of law, the
surreptitious enactment and enforcement of norms via
architecture should give us pause.
2. NORMS AND SOCIAL PRACTICES
The danger of architectural regulation runs even deeper, I
suggest. Even without a good theory of how social norms evolve,
it should be uncontroversial to assert that law's normative
grounding is a function of social experience, the environment in
which social norms are born, live, and evolve, or die. Social
experience and norms, in turn, are often reference points for
law. Government action aimed at shaping equipment or
organizing social settings directly alters the conditions of social
experience.
Studies of disputes, for instance, suggest that a threshold
factor in believing that one has a legal claim is the perception of
an event as injurious. 29 If norms are architected into settings or
equipment, however, they may seem like mere design features.
As a result, we may not perceive architecture normatively, as
something intended to control us, but rather as experienced
background conditions that just happen to exist.
Much law acts on background conditions. Seatbelt and
airbag regulations, for instance, clearly architect automobiles in
order to preclude social experience with unsafe cars. But the
potential "distortion" of social experience is especially
29 William L. F. Felstiner, et al., The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, and Claiming, 15 L. & SOC'Y
REV. 631 (1981) (noting the role of "perceived injurious event"). Such
perceptions can change over time; for many years, the vast majority of
Americans likely conceived of curbs as those lacking wheelchair ramps, which
thus restricted the mobility of disabled persons. Those confined to
wheelchairs probably thought of curbs differently.
2003-2004
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problematic when constitutional rights are at issue.
Constitutional rights are supposed to constrain or limit
government. But government power over the design and
distribution of resources can influence the exercise of rights. The
First Amendment, for example, protects the right to speak
anonymously, 30 but our ability to exercise that right depends on
our having equipment, like coin payphones, that does not "log"
who we are. A common software program, like the Apache Web
server offers a different example. This program, by default,
records those who visit a website and post information 31 ;
architectural regulation aimed at preventing a non-logging
configuration would make anonymous browsing harder.
It seems uncontroversial to think that the practical
exercise of rights is important to sustaining them as rights.
When social norms have a constitutional dimension - when
they breathe content into constitutional law - architectural
regulation of social settings in which these norms evolve, 32
possibly constraining the exercise or practice of rights, may
weaken constitutional protections.
This issue is particularly important with respect to
Fourth Amendment privacy. Our legal "reasonable expectation
of privacy" supposedly turns on social conventions, norms, or
"understandings" 33 that "are in large part reflections of laws
that translate into rules the customs and values of the past and
present."34 And because the Fourth Amendment is meant to
check government discretion,35 government ought not be free to
30 E.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elec. Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
31 See, e.g., Russell Dyer, Apache Logs, UNIX REVIEW, July 2004,
at http//www.unixreview.com/ documents/s=8989/ur0407i/.
32 Current legal scholarship views norms as evolving under
competition. See, e.g., Randal Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World.' A
Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225
(1997); Symposium, Law, Economies, & Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643
(1996).
33 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (noting that
Fourth Amendment turns on social "understandings," and that "legitimation
of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth
Amendment").
34 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); ef Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12 (noting that it is "merely
tautological" to base legitimate expectations "primarily on cases deciding
exclusionary-rule issues in criminal cases").
35 United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972)
(Fourth Amendment embodies "historical judgment", under which
"unreviewed executive discretion" may endanger privacy and speech).
TIEN
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strategically manipulate our privacy customs or practices. 36
Indeed, the Supreme Court has warned that if the government
sought to manipulate our actual privacy expectations by
announcing on national TV that all homes are subject to
warrantless entry, those expectations "could play no meaningful
role" in determining the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection. 37
Architectural regulation, however, can manipulate the
very resources we use to create or protect privacy. Our privacy is
often a function of the design of social settings. One who works
in an office can create some privacy by closing a door; one who
works in an open cubicle cannot.
Similarly, our social expectations of privacy are
meaningless without boundaries of some sort. We produce
privacy, when we can, by doing things like closing doors. An act
like door-closing not only produces some physical privacy by
limiting physical and sensory access, it also invokes a common
privacy norm - every well-socialized person understands that
closing a door signals a desire for privacy. It is no accident that
when the Supreme Court found that telephone calls from phone
booths were entitled to legal privacy protection, it appealed to
the fact that the defendant closed the phone booth door behind
him. 38
What if there had been no door to close? When a person
makes a telephone call from an unenclosed public telephone, he
or she has no privacy expectation against a nearby police officer
listening in.39 If the government facilitated surveillance by
inducing telephone companies to remove phone booth doors, or
had never permitted phone booth doors in the first place, would
36 Cass Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 903, 966 (1996) ("efforts to change norms ... should not be allowed to
invade rights").
37 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) ("when an
individual's subjective expectations had been 'conditioned' by influences alien
to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective
expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining the
scope of Fourth Amendment protection .... a normative inquiry would be
proper.").
38 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). The holding
in Katz may illustrate Robert Sugden's point that conventions can spread by
analogy. Robert Sugden, Spontaneous Order, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 85, 93-94
(1989).
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the Fourth Amendment apply? Government proposals to restrict
the availability, strength or use of privacy-enhancing technology
like encryption present a similar possibility: we are prevented
from exercising our right to privacy and we are deprived of social
experience with that right.
The design and deployment of equipment reflects a
normative vision of social activity. The differences between law
as sanction-backed rules and law as architecture - most of
which revolve around lack of transparency - produce normative
effects that are especially obvious when equipment is involved.
III. How HIGH TECHNOLOGY EXACERBATES ARCHITECTURAL
REGULATION'S PROBLEMS
So far, I have argued that architectural regulation poses a
risk of distorting the "normal" social processes of norm
formation for two major reasons. On the one hand, architectural
regulation is likely to be less perceptible to the general public as
law than legal rules. On the other hand, architectural regulation
can affect social practices in a more direct way: it can put some
practices in play, and take others off the field entirely (or at
least marginalize them).
Although architectural regulation is not inherently
associated with technological change, these issues are raised
most clearly in that context. In this section I explain in more
detail how architectural regulation is less perceptible than
sanction-backed legal rules and argue that these problems are
more serious in the high-technology context.
A. ENACTMENT, AUTHORSHIP, AND THE CONTENT OF
ARCHITECTURAL NORMS
Lessig has highlighted the transparency problem mainly
in terms of the government's attempting to "hide the pedigree"
of regulation 4O: the public may be misled as to the fact that
government sought to architect the situation. He is right, but
the problems are more serious.
40 CODE, supra note 1, at 98.
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First, it may not be obvious to the ordinary person that
anyone, much less the government, sought to architect the
situation, that is, that equipment or a social setting was
deliberately designed to regulate behavior. Second, the "content"
of the architectural regulation, what it actually does and why,
may not be obvious either.
1. SYSTEMS AND TIME
Although architectural regulation is not inherently
associated with technological change, these issues are raised
most clearly in that context. First, embedding regulation in
equipment or settings affects how rules are presented to us.
Equipment like e-mail and Web browser software embodies
various default settings that affect users' privacy, but they are
buried in the program's code. For instance, when you click on a
hyperlink to go to a new web page, your browser by default
automatically sends the URL of the page you came from to the
next site. If you used a search engine to find a site, the entire
query, including the search terms you used, is usually passed
along to the sites you then clicked on.41 How many people know
that this happens?
These default settings may seem "normal" because the
equipment is common, or have become "legitimate" as people
have grown accustomed to the situation presented by the
equipment. 42 This problem is especially significant for privacy
rights, because privacy is already easily violated in secret.
Second, the perceptibility of architectural regulation
(either at all or as an architected rather than "natural"
constraint) can depend on apprehending the setting and the
system to which it belongs. But as we do not experience the
entire system of social settings all at once, the meaning of the
overall design may be obscure. Small or gradual changes might
go unnoticed. Not only might we be unable to "see" the entire
setting or system at one time, we might not understand what we
see without extra knowledge as mundane as how a setting had
previously been organized.
41 JUNKBUSTERS CORPORATION, JUNKBUSTERS ALERT ON WEB
PRIVACY, at http://www.iunkbusters.com/ cgi-bin/ privacy (last visited Nov.
10, 2004).
42 See Cass Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L.
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After the original payphones had disappeared from the
drug-infested neighborhood, people might not even realize that
the setting had been deliberately architected at all. A visitor
frustrated by being unable to find a payphone might perceive no
act of social control, simply an annoying circumstance.
These effects are greater with new technologies precisely
because we have had less experience with them. We may notice
payphones that cannot receive calls because traditional
payphones did receive calls, but most of us have no basis for
evaluating changes in the default settings of newer systems like
the Internet. Thus, architectural regulation of new technological
settings is more likely to be perceived as a "normal" part of
social practice than a rule expressly declared to apply to that
setting.
Finally, we cannot easily exit large-scale socio-technical
systems like telecommunications. The ordinary person who
wants to make telephone calls or send electronic mail will be
subject to the architecture of the public telephone network and
the Internet.
2. INTERMEDIARIES AND THE MULTIPLE ACTOR
PROBLEM
Intermediated settings present additional problems.
When there are multiple actors, it may be difficult to link an
architectural change to the responsible party. Most of us know
that speed bumps are the product of government action because
we know that the government regulates public streets. But if a
social setting is private, or has both private and public aspects,
it may be difficult to say whether any state action has occurred.
In my hypothetical, the telephone company might have removed
the neighborhood payphones out of its own private concern
about bad public relations about drug dealing, or the local
government might have induced it to do so. It is plausible that
the government's role might not be apparent to the public; the
government might even seek to hide its role.43
43 The FBI's recent petition to the Federal Communications
Commission, which seeks to clarify telecommunications carriers' duties under
the Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act of 1994, argues that
"a carrier would not be permitted to describe any end-user surcharge applied
by the carrier to recover its CALEA implementation and compliance costs as
mandated by the Commission or the federal government (e.g., the FBI)." U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, AND DRUG
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B. TECHNICAL IGNORANCE
These effects are enhanced by the public's lack of
technical knowledge about computers, software, and the
Internet. Most people know little about such equipment: what it
does, and what they can do about it if they do not like it. They
may be unaware that a setting has changed in an important
way, or that their expectations about the setting are false. For
example, a typical web page with banner advertisements looks
like a single web page, but two banner ads on the same page can
come from two different companies. 44 Also, we interface with
only small parts of extended systems like the telephone system
or the Internet. Such systems involve many intermediaries and
much equipment that we cannot access; partly as a result, we
know little about and have little control over what is going on
inside the system.
This ignorance has normative implications. To say that a
system is wrongly designed, or that it should have been designed
differently, requires knowledge about design options and
tradeoffs. If information about alternative design options does
not reach the public, a basis for such normative judgments
vanishes. But even if the public did perceive bad design, it might
not perceive it as wrong design without knowledge that there
was a decision to design it that way. Where equipment affects
privacy, lack of knowledge is especially important because it is
often difficult to detect privacy invasions.
C. OPPORTUNITIES FOR GOVERNMENT MANIPULATION
The government often plays an important role in funding
or shaping the infrastructure of these large, dispersed systems
by endorsing standards for their deployment and design.
Equipment usually becomes standardized around some design
feature or feature set. Not only are there economies associated
with standards, many types of equipment must work together,
requiring standard protocols.
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, JOINT PETITION FOR EXPEDITED RULEMAKING TO
RESOLVE VARIOUS OUTSTANDING ISSUES CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT, RM-
10865, at 67 n.13 (Mar. 10, 2004).
44 JUNKBUSTERS CORPORATION, supra note 41.
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Many standards are purely technical and may have no
impact on constitutional rights, but some do directly affect our
privacy or civil liberties. One example is the law enforcement-
friendly Escrowed Encryption Standard ("EES"), which was
promulgated as a Federal Information Processing Standard
Publication ("FIPS")45. FIPSs (which are commonly used by
federal agencies in their procurement specifications) "can have
enormous significance to the private sector" even though private
actors are not required to adopt them. In this case:
[t]he government hoped that the adoption of the
EES to ensure secure communications within the
federal government and for communication of other
parties with the federal government would lead to a
significant demand for EES-compliant devices, thus
making possible production in larger quantities and
thereby driving unit costs down and making EES-
compliant devices more attractive to other users. 46
A current example is the Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act of 1994 ("CALEA"). 47 CALEA responded to
the FBI's complaint that advanced telephone technologies would
hinder law enforcement attempts to intercept communications.
CALEA requires telephone companies to be able to provide law
enforcement with the entire contents of a wiretapping target's
communications. It also requires that they be able to provide
4Ccall setup information," i.e., information about who is calling,
who is being called, and other information not directly related to
the content of the phone conversation. CALEA in effect
mandates that telephone systems be designed to facilitate
government surveillance.
Absent government interference, technological and
economic change might have led some telecommunications
service providers ("TSPs") to offer encrypted telephone calls and
other privacy enhancements that would safeguard call content
and call-identifying information. These possibilities were largely
foreclosed by CALEA. Today, the FBI and other law enforcement
agencies are seeking to extend CALEA to apply to certain
45 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, U.S.
COMMERCE DEP'T'S TECHNOLOGY ADMINISTRATION, FEDERAL INFORMATION
PROCESSING STANDARD PUB. 185, ESCROWED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (1994).
46 CRISIS Report, supra note 10, at 222-225.
47 See PUB. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1010 and various sections of Title 18 and Title 47 of the U.S. Code).
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Internet services such as the "voice over Internet protocol."
CALEA exemplifies how the State can make law with
equipment, causing rules to be built into social practices. The
design feature of "tappability" is embedded into the telephone
system, and we have no choice about using TSPs if we are to
make phone calls. We cannot exit the system.
In essence, the government is acting as a "norm
entrepreneur": it has embedded a norm of tappability into the
phone system, and seeks to embed that norm into other
communications systems. Doing so may distort social processes
of norm formation, and a further concern is that courts may find
that these equipment-defined parameters reflect a social
consensus. 48 In my view, the government ought not act as a
norm entrepreneur when the norms at issue concern
constitutional rights.
D. NORMS AND UNCOMMON KNOWLEDGE
Obviously, a major theme in my discussion has been the
role of knowledge - knowledge of equipment and social settings.
But from the perspective of social norms, other kinds of
knowledge are also important: knowledge about what other
people think and do, and why.
For instance, privacy conventions or norms should be
expected to arise from privacy practices - patterns of action that
emerge over time, like our closing doors to protect our privacy,
or our treating eavesdropping at keyholes as being improper. 49
When two people converse quietly in a park away from
bystanders, they expect not to be approached or attended to by
strangers, because a well-socialized person would recognize that
they are speaking privately. If someone approaches or appears
to eavesdrop, they adjust: stare silently, move away, or change
the subject. The key relation here is between precautions and
48 Thus, in Katz the Supreme Court found that given phone
booths with doors, closing the door clearly constituted a privacy precaution,
while in Smith making phone calls given that the telephone company logged
one's calling records negated any possible privacy claim.
49 See EDNA ULLMAN-MARGOLIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 8
(1977) (norms are "the resultant of complex patterns of behavior of a large
number of people over a protracted period of time").
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risks; precautions are geared to perceived likely risks, and vice
versa.
Privacy behavior is thus interdependent: people "respond.
• to an environment that consists of other people responding to
their environment, which consists of people responding to an
environment of people's responses."50 How privacy norms evolve
remains unclear, but theorists suggest that behavior in repeated
interactions can over time coordinate toward a norm, much as a
well-trod footpath visibly displays its popularity.5 1 It is not
implausible to hypothesize a "critical mass" model in which
expectations "depend ... on how many are behaving a particular
way, or how much they are behaving that way."52
But the evolution of a convention or social expectation
depends not only on the amount or frequency of behavior, but on
our "common knowledge" of it. 53 Although we all may treat like
situations alike, our actions are not "normal" without the
second-order knowledge that others do and think the same as
well, that we know they know, and so on.
In general, the coordination that leads to the emergence
of norms requires common knowledge or at least publicity. 54 But
a problem with privacy is that privacy risks and privacy
behavior (e.g., taking precautions) are often invisible. You might
know that email is easily viewed by your Internet Service
Provider ("ISP"), or that surfing the Internet exposes your
browsing activity to your ISP, but you might not know whether
others are also aware. Similarly, the precautions you take to
protect your email or browsing, such as encrypting your email or
50 THOMAS SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 14
(1978).
51 "Everyone conforms, everyone expects others to conform, and
everyone has good reason to conform because conforming is in each person's
best interest when everyone else plans to conform." H. Peyton Young, The
Economics of Convention, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 105 (1996).
52 SCHELLING, supra note 50, at 94.
53 "A proposition is 'common knowledge' among a group of
individuals if all know the proposition to be true, all know that the others
know the proposition to be true, all know that all others know the proposition
to be true, and so on." Paul Mahoney and Chris Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated
Games, and the Role ofLaw, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1301 n.42 (2003); see
Michael Chwe, Culture, Circles, and Commercials: Publicity, Common
Knowledge, and Social Coordination, 10 RATIONALITY & SOC'Y 47, 49-50
(1998).
54 See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 17, at 388, 400-405
(discussing role of publicity and visible consensus to norm formation).
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browsing via an anonymizing service, tend to be private and are
not visible to others as precautions.
Notions like critical mass and common knowledge help
explain why public concern about privacy often has a "crisis"
character. Many people are concerned about their privacy, but
privacy breaches often happen in the background. And even
when people are victims and know about the problem, they may
think that theirs are isolated cases. But when at some point a
privacy issue like identity theft becomes a mass media subject,
the victims' private knowledge may become common knowledge
that can support a normative judgment that something is
wrong.55
IV. CONCLUSION
We have come to accept that the law must adjust to the
rapid pace of technological change. However, we should be alert
to the possibility that government adjustments will also affect
constitutional rights and norms. Government action that
architects social settings and equipment can regulate our
behavior as effectively as can sanction-backed rules.
In two respects, however, "law as architecture" is more
dangerous than ordinary sanction-backed legal rules to the
concept of law. Architectural regulation is less visible as law, not
only because it can be surreptitiously embedded into settings or
equipment but also because its enforcement is less public.
Furthermore, it can be used to foreclose possibilities of social
experience. It thus has a more secret social career than law as
sanction-backed rules, and these effects are magnified with each
new technology. Architectural regulation thus raises two
important issues for law: the relationship between resources and
rights, and the relationship between resources and social norms
that translate content into constitutional law.
55 Cf Chwe, supra note 53, at 59 (noting that network TV is
"best mass common knowledge generator").
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